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ABSTRACT 
This thesis seeks to determine whether the relationship between the United States 
and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia can continue to survive in light of the unprecedented 
developments that have challenged this partnership within the last decade.  It will address 
this question through careful review of the history of the U.S.–Saudi partnership from 
1931 to the present.  The thesis will then analyze the information to answer the question, 
asserting that the relationship is more robust than generally perceived. The analysis will 
also support the notion that, despite the numerous disagreements that have occurred 
throughout the U.S.–Saudi relationship, the two nations have always reverted back to 
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This thesis seeks to determine whether the relationship between the United States 
and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia can continue to survive in light of the unprecedented 
developments that have challenged this partnership within the last decade.  It will address 
this question through careful review of the history of the U.S.-Saudi partnership from 
1931 to the present.  The thesis will then analyze the information to answer the question, 
asserting that the relationship is more robust than generally perceived. The analysis will 
also support the notion that, despite the numerous disagreements that have occurred 
throughout the U.S.-Saudi relationship, the two nations have always reverted back to its 
mutually beneficial strategic partnership, enduring most of the challenges that have 
presented themselves. 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is very influential on the world’s stage, by virtue of 
being the birthplace of Islam and having the largest oil reserves.  With this, Saudi Arabia 
can wield its power by simply controlling its oil production output, making or breaking 
economies.  By the same token, the Kingdom can utilize it oil resource for political gain, 
as it did during the Oil Embargo of 1973-74 when it halted oil exportation to the U.S. to 
protest its support for Israel.  This disrupted the seemingly comfortable lives of most 
Americans.  
The United States sees the strategic value of Saudi oil and its influence on global 
economies. The U.S. understands the benefits to be gained from continued access to this 
oil — as long as it can stay engaged in the region, providing the very defense that the 
Kingdom lacks. 
U.S.–Saudi diplomatic relations were established on the foundation of military, 
political, and commercial understandings developed during and immediately following 
the Second World War, and replaced the British as the Kingdom’s chief political and 
economic supporter.  The U.S. and the Kingdom pursued common mutually beneficial 
national security objectives henceforth, in spite of recurring differences on various 
regional issues, with the most significant being the Arab–Israeli conflict. 
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The Arab–Israeli conflict in 1973 brought latent tensions between the two 
countries to the forefront and altered prevailing political and economic dynamics of the 
relationship.  Though the Saudis supported anti-Communist efforts around the world in 
the 1970s and 1980s, the end of the Cold War signaled a shift in the relationship that had 
previously served as its premise.1 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the U.S. continued to apply its national 
instruments of power to help ensure continued flow of Saudi oil to international markets.  
After the U.N. Coalition achieved victory in ejecting Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991, 
Western forces remained in Saudi Arabia to support the Clinton Administration’s policy 
of “dual containment” of both Iraq and Iran.    
The continued U.S. presence consequently caused upheaval in the Kingdom, as 
traditional Muslims perceived this to be an extension of colonial power, as well an act of 
desecration because non-Muslims were providing the safeguard for the birthplace of 
Islam.2  As a consequence, the Kingdom saw increased violence directed at Americans, 
with terrorist bombings at the Saudi Arabian National Guard Headquarters and the 
Khobar Towers housing facility near Riyadh, resulting in the deaths of 24 U.S. military 
personnel.3 
Inside the Kingdom, Saudi political activists challenged the ruling family over 
fiscal policy, constitutional government and foreign policy that had largely been 
proscribed since the 1950s.  Though the regime was increasingly repressing opposition 
movements that had surfaced since the 1990 Gulf crisis, others remained and caused new 
problems for the ruling family.  The Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights 
                                                 
1 CRS Report for Congress, “Saudi Arabia:  Background and U.S. Relations,” May 22, 2008; 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33533.pdf  [Last Accessed September 22, 2008]. 
2  Bradley Bowman, “After Iraq:  Future U.S. Military Posture in the Middle East,” The Washington 
Quarterly, Spring 2008. 
3 Steven Lee Myers, “At a Saudi Base, U.S. Digs In, Gingerly, for a Longer Stay,” New York Times, 
December 27, 1997. 
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(CDLR), for example created a platform for non violent dissent propagating regime-
damaging socio-political and economic information into and out of the kingdom.4 
These events have spawned renewed activism, with prominent Islamic scholars, 
such as Dr. Halawi, challenging the legitimacy of the ruling family, due to the regime’s 
dependency on the United States, an ardent supporter of Israel.5  U.S.–Saudi relations 
have been further eroded by the 9/11 terrorist attacks, as fifteen of the nineteen terrorists 
were of Saudi descent, which implied Saudi government complicity on some level.6  
Saudi opposition to U.S. involvement in the war on terror, including perceived unjust 
wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq, has also stirred tension.  The U.S.–Saudi partnership 
has not suffered like this since the oil crisis of 1973, and both Western and Islamic 
academics question whether this alliance can continue. 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Understanding the course of events that led to the complex relationship between 
the United States and Saudi Arabia is important to frame any discussion of the broader 
issues at play.  Many authors have given their version of how the relationship came to be 
and how it changed global dynamics for decades henceforth.  
The origins of Saudi rivalry stem from the conquests of Ibn Sa’ud, who formed a 
Wahhabist army and became the dominant power in the Gulf region, with the help of the 
British.  The rivalries that existed then, have carried over and continue to exist today.  
Anthony Cordesman, a well-known expert on the Middle East, conveys this very 
effectively through his monograph entitled, “Saudi Arabia, the U.S. and the Structure of 




                                                 
4 Daryl Champion, “The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:  Elements of Instability Within Stability,” Middle 
East Review of International Affairs,  December 1999. 
5 Madawi Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia (UK:  Cambridge University Press, 2002), 166. 
6 David B. Ottaway and Robert G. Kaiser, “After Sept. 11, Severe Tests Loom for Relationship,” 
Washington Post, February 12, 2002. 
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prior to the establishment of modern Saudi Arabia.  This monograph gives an accurate 
historical account of the Gulf region under Ottoman rule and identifies the pattern  
of alliances of Saudi Arabia in the region.7 
One of the primary sources used to highlight the history of U.S.–Saudi relations, 
specifically is Anthony Cave Brown’s book entitled, Oil, God, and Gold: The Story of 
Aramco and the Saudi Kings.  The author gives a thrilling account of the rise of Aramco, 
which was originally led by a consortium of American investors.  The U.S.-owned 
Standard Oil of California, which later became the Arabian American Oil Company 
(“Aramco”), managed to penetrate a territory tightly controlled by the British, in large 
part due to the efforts H. St. John Philby, a British spy who had a close and trusting 
relationship with Saudi King Ibn Saud.  Philby was the personal advisor to the King and 
one of the primary negotiators who facilitated the oil exploration contract of 1933, which 
granted the Standard Oil Company of California exclusive rights to oil exploration in the 
Kingdom.  This work also details the role of Chicago-born entrepreneur and diplomat 
Charles Crane, who built a costly waterworks system, bringing drinking water into the 
Saudi interior.  In his quest for water exploration, Crane discovered vast amounts of oil 
deposits and alerted his engineers to exploit this further.  Aramco would later make 
trillions of dollars over its history, producing millions of barrels of oil daily by the late 
1950s, while dabbling in international politics to protect its interests.8 
Brown’s skill in relating the complex relations among the Saudi royal family, the 
secretive oil executives and the American and British governments, is also useful. He 
brings the reader through the post-WWII transfer of world hegemony from the British 
Empire to the U.S., explaining the symbiosis of corporate and Saudi politics against the 
backdrop of the Cold War, the Israeli–Arab conflict and the Iran–Iraq war.9 
                                                 
7 Anthony Cordesman, “Saudi Arabia, the US and the Structure of Gulf Alliances,” Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, February 25, 1999. 
8 Anthony Cave Brown, Oil, God, and Gold: The Story of Aramco and the Saudi Kings (Boston and 
New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1999). 
9 Ibid. 
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Another useful source for researching the chronology and the depth of U.S.–Saudi 
relations is the book, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power, by Daniel 
Yergin, for which he won the Pulitzer Prize in 1992.  Yergin is one of the foremost U.S. 
authorities on energy, and this book is a major work in the field.  He describes the 
relationship of oil to the rise of modern capitalism; the intertwining relations between oil, 
politics, and international power; and the relationship between oil and society.  Yergin 
further highlights oil’s central role in most of the wars and many international crises of 
the twentieth century.10  
Still, in the book, Saudi Arabia and the United States: Birth of a Security 
Partnership, Parker T. Hart examines the intertwined politics of Saudi Arabia and the 
United States.  The author personally witnessed this during his missions to the Arabian 
Peninsula from the late 1940s through the 1960s. The United States and Saudi Arabia 
were actively seeking to develop diplomatic relations, as the U.S. was eager to align itself 
with an oil giant while the Kingdom viewed the U.S. as a politically and economically 
powerful ally important to its development in the unstable Middle Eastern region.  Hart’s 
book takes on a narrative form, and appears biased due to his position as an Embassy 
official, ignoring the social and political systems of the involved parties.  
He provides an overview of Middle Eastern history, as well as an in-depth 
portrayal of various Saudi individuals and its society in general. Hart further defines the 
foundation of U.S.–Saudi relations by providing simplistic explanations of political 
intricacies in the Kingdom.  Hart recognizes the importance of culture in diplomatic 
relations, especially after his encounter with King Faisal.11 He also attributes Nasser’s 
failure to win over Saudi popular support, due to Nasser’s lack of knowledge therein.12 
An Arab perspective of the Kingdom’s history was also provided in the book by 
Madawi Al-Rasheed entitled, A History of Saudi Arabia, which portrays the Kingdom as 
                                                 
10 Daniel Yergin, The Prize:  The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power (New York: Free Press, New 
York, January 1993). 
11 Parker T. Hart, Saudi Arabia and the United States: Birth of a Security Partnership (Bloomington, 
Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1998), 146 
12 Ibid., 159. 
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a wealthy and powerful country that exerts influence in the West and across the Islamic 
world, despite it being a closed society. The author traces its history from the age of 
emirates in the nineteenth century to the present day. Fusing chronology with analysis, 
personal experience with oral histories, Al Rasheed conveys the social and cultural life of 
the Saudis.  
Al-Rasheed’s book was especially useful when attempting to understand the 
general sentiment of the average Saudi in light of prolonged Western troop presence in 
the Kingdom after the first Gulf War in 1991 and how this presence spawned elements of 
Saudi society to question the legitimacy of the ruling family because they had 
mismanaged the economy in order to bolster the military. This supposedly “modernized” 
military responded dismally to Saddam’s threat to the Kingdom, necessitating the use of 
non-Muslim Western troops for its defense.13  Furthermore, revolt within the traditional 
Islamic sect transpired, as “infidels” were present in the holiest land of the Islamic faith, 
waging war against their brethren Muslims.14   
Other publications that played an important role in defining the U.S.–Saudi 
relationship as they stand today, include the numerous periodicals appearing in major 
newspapers, such as the Los Angeles Times, New York Times and Washington Post. Many 
of these articles were comprised of feeds from Associated Press, providing late-breaking 
news of potential scandals, such as the Saudi purchase of Chinese Missiles in response to 
U.S. refusal to provide the same.15  These reports often exposed events before they 
actually happened, like the potential of the Beirut Summit offering a viable solution to 
the Israeli–Palestinian dispute, only to be violently disrupted by terrorist bombings in 
Israel and the subsequent Israeli response that resulted in Operation Defensive Shield, 
further polarizing the Arab world against the Jews.16  Also, the foresight and analysis 
                                                 
13 Madawi Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia (UK:  Cambridge University Press, 2002), 166. 
14 Ibid. 
15 John M. Goshko and Don Oberdorfer, “Chinese Sell Saudis Missiles Capable of Covering Mideast,” 
Washington Post, March 18, 1988. 
16 Bandar bin Sultan, “Why Israel Must Stop The Terror,” Washington Post, April 5, 2002. 
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provided, regarding Saudi discontent with the ongoing Western troop presence after the 
first Gulf War, which ultimately led to their withdrawal, proved very insightful.17 
Finally, the annual reports, produced by the Congressional Research Service on 
the current state of U.S.–Saudi relations, proved most helpful. These publications 
provided seemingly unbiased accounts compiled by analysts of Middle Eastern affairs, of 
the issues that threatened the partnership, as well as progress made since the reports from 
previous years.  Issues, such as regulating Saudi banking to curb terrorist financing and 
improved Saudi cooperation in the fight against terrorism, were identified and helped 
chart the improvements and pitfalls of the relationship.18 
B. HISTORY 
1. Saudi Arabia and Its Gulf Neighbors 
One defining premise behind the U.S.–Saudi relationship was the discovery of oil 
in Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom’s need for protection from external threats.  A review 
of the brief history of the Gulf region clarifies the background of the Kingdom’s 
relationships with its neighbors and the patterns that repeat themselves.  The rivalries and 
the alliances appear to have remained much the same, and the U.S. has now assumed the 
role of major protector in the Gulf—a role played by Britain throughout the first half of 
the twentieth century. 
In early Gulf civilization, power was associated with trade and militarism.  
Initially, the principal trade routes in the region bypassed the Gulf.  “Military invasions 
and the silk route moved through Central Asia, or across Iran and Iraq.”19  The silk route 
never involved a high volume of trade and had utilized land or the Red Sea for its route.  
Control over Mecca and Medina was imperative to the trade market and created Islamic 
power in the Red Sea area, briefly making Arabia dominant in the region.  Islam 
                                                 
17 David B. Ottaway and Robert G. Kaiser, “Saudis May Seek U.S. Exit; Military Presence Seen as 
Political Liability in Arab World,” Washington Post, January 18, 2002. 
18 CRS Report for Congress, “Saudi Arabia:  Background and U.S. Relations,” May 22, 2008; 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33533.pdf  [Last accessed September 22, 2008]. 
19 Cordesman, “Saudi Arabia, the US and the Structure of Gulf Alliances,” 8. 
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proceeded to create the Caliphate that eventually replaced the Parthian Empire, 
consolidating Arab and Islamic political power.20 
Arab nationalism persisted, despite centuries of Ottoman rule.21  An alliance was 
created between the Sa’ud family and a new, puritanical Islamic sect led by Muhammad 
Wahab, prompting Saudi Arabia and alliances in the Gulf to revolt, seizing Mecca and 
Medina in 1803–1806.22   The Sa’ud uprising had a limited impact along the Gulf coast 
and Muhammad Ali ultimately recaptured most of the Arabian Peninsula for  
Turkey, again shifting power to the Ottoman Turks. 
By the mid-1800s, the Gulf had under utilized routes for trade, and the region, 
consequently had little economic importance aside from the minor impact of the pearling 
industry.23  Iran’s Qazar Dynasty was on the brink of collapse and Iraq was a debilitated 
region on the eastern fringe area of the Ottoman Empire.24  At this point in history, little 
trade passed through the Gulf to Turkey.25  
There were small villages in the Gulf that eventually became Kuwait, Bahrain, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.  These fishing villages were centers of tribal rivalry 
and feuds, and their meager economies were “based mainly on pearling and piracy.”26  
Modern Saudi Arabia arose from disparate tribal areas, with the most important enclave 
dominated by the Hashemite family who acted as the Sherif of Mecca.  The Sa’ud family 
had essentially become obscured and, even in its home region of Najd, was no longer the 
most influential family.27 
                                                 
20 Cordesman, “Saudi Arabia, the US and the Structure of Gulf Alliances,” 8. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., 9. 






2. The al-Sa’ud family – British Alliance 
The obscurity of the Sa’ud family changed dramatically, as they regained 
prominence as a result of an alliance with the British.  In a joint effort with the British, 
the Sa’ud family sought to suppress piracy in the Gulf.  The British also utilized the Suez 
Canal as a major trading route to India, and created coaling stations along this route in 
various ports.  More importantly, the British sought to protect these routes, as they feared 
a Turkish–German attack on India during World War I.  This British fear prompted a 
gradual creation of a new structure of alliances wherein small Southern Gulf states 
became protectorates of Britain.  Thus, a newly created dependence on the “West” 
provided the Sa’ud family with a counter-balance to Turkish and Persian military power, 
as well as a source of protection against invasion by neighboring families and states.28 
A study of the pattern of alliances between the Sa’ud family and the British 
illustrates an ironic parallel to the U.S.–Saudi relationship.  Namely, the Sa’ud family 
alliance with the British revolved around “Western” power at a time when Saudi Arabia 
and Iraq were little more than sheikdoms, and that there existed a “complex balance of 
power between Turkey, Persia, weak Southern Gulf states, and British power  
projection.”29  Similarly, the U.S.–Saudi relationship consists of a complex balance of 
power between Iran, Iraq, the Southern Gulf and U.S. power projection.30 
3. The Creation of Modern Saudi Arabia 
Modern Saudi Arabia was created shortly before World War II when Abdul Aziz 
Ibn Abdur Rahman Al-Faisal Al Saud (“Ibn Sa’ud”) led a fierce raid that seized Riyadh 
from a nearby family, thereby beginning a new Arab uprising under the guise of the 
Wahhab Islamist sect.  Upon the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire after the First 
World War, newly drawn demarcation lines resulted in the creation of Iraq, causing a 
                                                 
28 Cordesman, “Saudi Arabia, the US and the Structure of Gulf Alliances,” 9. 
29 Cordesman, “Saudi Arabia, the US and the Structure of Gulf Alliances,”  9. 
30 Ibid. 
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broader Arab revolt in Arabia. The fall of the Qazar dynasty during that time also created 
modern Iran from what was once known as Persia.31 
The new Arab uprising, the creation of Iraq and the fall of the Qazar dynasty 
created a power vacuum in the Arabian Peninsula resulting in the Sa’ud family becoming 
the dominant regional military power.32  Ibn Sa’ud formed a religious army called the 
Ihkwan, comprised of supporters of the Wahhab sect, which conquered most of the region 
in the early 1920s, including the Hashemite family, who were forced into exile becoming 
the rulers of Transjordan and Iraq.33  
By the mid-1920s, the Sa’ud family, utilized their new position of power and 
threatened all of the Southern Gulf states, Iraq, and Jordan.  British power was vital in 
preventing Ibn Sa’ud and the Ihkwan from conquering Kuwait, Jordan and the other 
Trucial States.34  Ultimately, as a result of this upset, a series of treaties were signed 
between Saudi Arabia and Transjordan, Iraq, and Egypt during 1933–1936, shaping many 
of Saudi Arabia’s contemporary borders.35   
The last major conquest resulted from the Yemeni attack on Saudi Arabia in 1934.  
As a result of this attack, Saudi Arabia annexed a large part of Eastern Yemen, which 
remains a contentious issue to this day.36 
4. The Dynamic Shift in the Saudi–British Alliance 
Saudi Arabia’s alliance with Britain provided the Kingdom with the protection it 
needed to establish its modern presence.  However, Saudi relations with Britain differed 
sharply from those of most other states in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula.37  
Regardless of Saudi Arabia’s achievements attributable to the alliance with Britain, from 
                                                 
31 Cordesman, “Saudi Arabia, the US and the Structure of Gulf Alliances,” 10. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 





a Saudi perspective, the British presence in the region was far more of a constraint than a 
source of security.  Ultimately, the Saudi’s concerns were validated as the dynamics of 
Britain’s involvement with Saudi Arabia changed.38   
After 1925, Britain protected its interests by halting the Saudi advance on Kuwait, 
Iraq and Jordan, further inhibiting the Saudis’ ability to seize the Trucial city-states which 
were made up of Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman.39  Moreover, Britain made 
Hashemite the rulers of Iraq and Jordan in opposition to the desires of Saudi Arabia.40  
British efforts to monopolize oil concessions in Saudi Arabia and keep out rival 
American companies further exacerbated the eroding alliance.41   
Britain’s continuing interference in Iranian and Iraqi affairs, and their subsequent 
occupation of both countries during World War II, created a concern for Saudi Arabia as 
they feared suffering the same fate.  Based on the eroding alliance and the fear of a 
potential invasion by Britain, Ibn Sa’ud allowed the U.S. to create a major air base in 
Dhahran, eventually used as a base for U.S. strategic bombers during the Cold War.42   
The flirtation between United States and Saudi Arabia had, thus begun and the two 
countries explored further opportunities for a union. 
                                                 
38 Cordesman, “Saudi Arabia, the US and the Structure of Gulf Alliances,”  9. 
39 Ibid., 11. 
40 Ibid.  
41 Ibid. 
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II. U.S.–SAUDI RELATIONS 
A. HISTORY 
1. U.S. – Saudi Beginnings  
The xenophobic, Wahhabist Ikhwan opposed any foreigners in Arabia, as they 
considered outsiders “infidels” and distained all forms of innovation, which they deemed 
as “un-Islamic.”43  Furthermore, Wahhabism is described as follows: 
Unitarian movement, emerged from the teachings of Muhammed Bin 
Abdul Wahhab (1703–92).  It advocates God’s oneness and undivided 
almightiness and proved to be a potent force in the expansion of Al Sa’ud 
rule, providing religious legitimization for the conquest of the Arabian 
Peninsula while inculcating the population with a unifying belief system. 
Abdul Wahhab’s aim was to abolish all innovation following the 3rd 
Islamic century. His teachings are based on the idea that Islamhas sunk 
into impiety, and a return to its supposed former purity remains 
Wahhabism’s basic tenet. Anything that departs from the oneness of God 
as defined by the Wahhabis is guilty of idolatry, and implies disbelief. 44 
King Ibn Sa’ud, however, embraced technology, such as the telegraph and sought 
the counsel of outsiders to facilitate the consolidation of his power.45   The King then 
turned on the Ihkwan in 1929, with the assistance of the British, and the battle of Sibila 
subsequently crushed the Ihkwan, squelching their opposition.  After the U.S.–Saudi 
relationship was established, the al Sa’ud was criticized by the Wahhabists for opening 
the door to Western technology — an issue that would plague the Kingdom for years to 
come.46 
                                                 
43 Rethnavibushana, “Human Rights Double Standards in U.S. Policy Toward Saudi Arabia,” 
(PressEsc.com, June 16, 2007); http://pressesc.com/01181971170_Saudi_Arabia_hum 
an_rights_double_standards [Last accessed September 13, 2008]. 
44 Mai Yamani, “Reform, Security and Oil in Saudi Arabia,” Royal Institute of International Affairs; 
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/atf/cf/%7BDEB6F227-659B-4EC8-8F84-
8DF23CA704F5%7D/Yamani%20Paper.pdf  [Last Accessed September 26, 2008]. 
45 Rethnavibushana, “Human Rights Double Standards in U.S. Policy Toward Saudi Arabia.” 
46 Ibid. 
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The U.S. took initiative by officially recognizing the Saudi Kingdom in 1931, 
though their mutual interests were not well defined until 1933 after Saudi Arabia signed 
an oil concession with the U.S. firm of Standard Oil of California (Socal).47 
The relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia had been precipitated by a 
visit to the Kingdom in 1931 by Charles R. Crane, “a Chicago millionaire and 
philanthropist, world traveler, former ambassador, and associate of American 
presidents.”48 King Ibn Sa’ud’s British advisor, John Philby, a Muslim convert, had 
implored the King to encourage Crane’s visit, as Crane might be able to facilitate 
exploration for assets beneath the soil of the impoverished Kingdom, starting with water, 
of which the Kingdom was in short supply.49  Crane’s visit would have a meaningful and 
lasting impact on the Kingdom and the ensuing alliance with the U.S. 
Crane brought in engineers for a more accurate assessment and discovered that 
the area had tremendous potential to yield an even more valuable commodity, namely oil.  
In May 1933, after careful negotiation between H. St. John Philby, the representatives of 
Socal and the Saudi Minister of Finance, the King was persuaded to accept a sixty-year 
contract with Socal, providing Socal with exclusive rights to exploration and extraction in 
the al-Hasa region, on the shores of the Gulf (the “1933 Contract”).50   
Opportunistically, the potential for a U.S.–Saudi Alliance developed concurrently 
during King Ibn Sa’ud’s consolidation of his power, which terminated the King’s income 
other than the meager earnings he received from levies imposed on pilgrims traveling 
through Mecca and Medina.51  The pilgrimage traffic through Mecca and Medina, 
however, had dried up due to the Great Depression, thereby cutting off the King’s 
income.52  The King looked to outsiders to provide a stream of income as money was 
                                                 
47 Brown, Oil, God, and Gold: The Story of Aramco and the Saudi Kings, 9-56. 
48 Robert D. Kaplan, The Arabists: Romance of an American Elite (New York: The Free Press, 1995), 
68-72. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Brown, Oil, God, and Gold, 9-56. 
51 Rethnavibushana, “Human Rights Double Standards in U.S. Policy Toward Saudi Arabia.” 
 
 15
needed to purchase loyalty from the tribes and to import food.53  The U.S. became that 
“outsider” thus fulfilling that need for the King and his Kingdom.      
The relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia began cautiously and slowly 
because the remote Kingdom was still viewed by the U.S. as part of the British sphere of 
influence in the region, thereby minimizing its importance.54  The significance of the 
U.S.–Saudi relationship was more of a priority to the Saudi King, however because he 
saw America as a potential counterbalance to longstanding and unwelcomed British 
domination of the region.55  The King was not without trepidation, however, and the 
King’s concerns were clearly delineated in the terms of the 1933 contract, which 
contained the “anti-imperial” clause, explicitly rejecting “any company influence over the 
Kingdom’s internal affairs.”56   
King Ibn Sa’ud communicated Saudi demands with William A. Eddy, then Chief 
of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission in Jeddah.57  The King told Eddy that Saudis would use 
U.S. “iron,” though the U.S. “must leave Saudi faith alone.”58  Specifically, the King 
emphasized that the Qur’an “regulated all matters of faith, family and property, to the 
exclusion of the involvement of unbelievers.”59  Moreover, the King acknowledged that 
the U.S. had much that the Saudis needed and that they were willing to accept 
technology, such as “radio, airplanes, pumps, oil drilling rigs and know-how.”60  The 
King was quick to qualify the Saudi’s acceptance of U.S. assets while, on the other hand, 
demanding that the U.S. respect Saudi “patriarchal authorities and the failing of women”  
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as issues that did not concern the U.S.61  This acceptance of technology was far in 
advance of his people and the King had to battle bigots for the acceptance of the 
alliance.62 
To ease the societal acceptance of this alliance, Standard Oil of California was 
renamed the Arabian American Oil Company (“Aramco”) and in 1938, Aramco extracted 
oil in commercial quantities, exporting it the following year. 63 
Though official U.S.–Saudi ties began during the Great Depression, it was not 
until 1940 that an American diplomat first visited Saudi Arabia in a formal capacity.  
This 1940 visit to Saudi Arabia was by the U.S. envoy to Egypt, Bert Fish who was co-
accredited to the Kingdom (then called the Kingdom of the Hijaz and Najd and 
Dependencies).64  As he left to serve in Cairo, Fish traveled to Jeddah to meet the Saudi 
King. 
Though the foundation of the U.S. – Saudi relationship had been established, the 
cultural differences between the two countries created some apprehension and distrust.   
During the first few years of interaction between the Saudis and Americans, the 
exchanges were controlled and subdued.  Wahhabi religious authorities in Saudi Arabia 
wanted to minimize exposure of their citizens to Westerners and their culture.65  The first 
historic meeting between King Ibn Sa’ud and FDR is a preview of the cultural differences 
constantly challenging the alliance.   
This historic meeting took place on February 14, 1945, aboard theUSS Quincy in 
Egypt’s Great Bitter Lake.  The arrangements for the meeting were as complicated as the 
subject matter, due to the differences in culture and requirements of the Saudis.  The 
Saudi King wanted to bring his own sheep aboard the USS Quincy because of his belief 
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that good Muslims eat only freshly killed meat.  Additionally, the King brought 48 
travelling companions and insisted that they be able to construct tents on the deck of the 
ship rather than sleep in the cabins provided.66 
Despite these drastic cultural differences, the Saudis knew they were incapable of 
defending their borders without external assistance, so they were compelled to keep the 
U.S. nearby.67  The U.S. acknowledged this and because of its mutual interest, the U.S. 
maintained a continuous military presence, mostly made up of small training missions, 
and the option to rapidly expand that presence should the situation warrant this.  Hence, 
the U.S. has had some sort of military presence in Saudi Arabia since the end of the 
Second World War. 
The alliance between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia was the modern world’s most 
improbable bilateral alliance, based on the extreme contrast of the two powers.  No two 
countries and no two societies could have been more dissimilar.  The social environment 
and governmental system of each was alien and distasteful to the other and yet, Saudi 
Arabia and the U.S. worked together to the general satisfaction of both, in spite of the 
endless nuances of politics in the Middle East. .  This success can be attributed to the one 
fundamental policy followed by all U.S. Administrations since FDR:  “The United 
States does not interfere with Saudi Arabia’s internal affairs.  How Saudi Arabia 
treats its citizens is not the business of the United States.”68  
2. The Cold War 
The U.S. military had already entered Saudi Arabia for the first time, prior to the 
Cold War.69  The United States had also completed the modern airbase at Dhahran, near 
the al-Hasa oilfields.  Originally intended for logistical support to the Burma Theater, one 
of the focal locations where the Allies were fighting the Japanese, completion of the 
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Dahran airbase did not actually take place until after the war in 1946. The U.S. Air Force 
subsequently leased the Dhahran Airfield for over a decade, providing both reassurance 
and discomfort to their Saudi hosts, creating Saudi ambivalence that would persist for 
years to come.70 
The base at Dhahran set another precedent and caused consternation over 
American military presence in the Kingdom, and the broader security relationship.  While 
the United States might deter a potential aggressor during difficult times, too much of an 
American presence also created a standing provocation to the ultra-conservative religious 
authorities, or ulama, and served as a propaganda weapon to external and internal foes 
alike, especially in the Muslim world.  Consequently, Saudi leaders have alternated 
between enhanced security via the U.S. and minimizing that tie when deemed too 
unpopular.71 
The Americans in turn, attempted to balance Saudi security concerns and the 
implementation of their own strategies for the containment of Soviet power, ranging from 
alliance-building to nuclear deterrence.72  The attitudes of the U.S. and the Saudis 
resulted in a series of highs and lows in the relationship, depending on the alignment of 
the security needs of the Saudi state and the American policy of Soviet containment. 
Complications in the relationship arose in the early 1950s as a result of the 
American partnership with Britain, then a major regional power whose bases were within 
close proximity of the Kingdom.  The British were entangled in Arabian Peninsula border 
disputes, aligning themselves with the Saudis’ traditional rivals in Iraq and Jordan, ruled 
by kings of the Hashemite dynasty.  King Ibn Sa’ud had displaced the Hashemites from 
the Red Sea emirate of Hijaz, home to the holy places of Mecca and Medina.  This posed 
a perceived threat to the Saudis because of the Hashemites’ proximity to the oil fields, 
their expansionist ambitions, and their British-trained military forces.  This resulted in the 
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Saudis entering into a mutual defense assistance pact with the United States in 1951, 
which included a long-term lease of Dhahran Airfield. 73   
U.S. strategy during this period focused on containing Soviet expansion and 
supported the formation of alliances to propagate this.   One such alliance that was 
formed in the region in 1955 was known as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), 
more commonly referred to as the “Baghdad Pact,” initiated by the U.S. and NATO 
allies, including Great Britain.  CENTO involved cooperation for security and defense, 
while refraining from any interference and respecting the internal affairs of its member 
countries.74 Signatories from the region included Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, and Iraq, many 
of which had been rivals and foes of the Kingdom.  King Sa’ud, the son and successor of 
Ibn Sa’ud, was not pleased with this arrangement, as he deemed the U.S. insensitive to 
the Kingdom’s history.  As a result, Sa’ud expelled the American aid mission from the 
country, and in October 1955, signed a mutual defense pact with Egypt’s Nasser, who 
had established a pro-Soviet revolutionary regime, and invited Egyptian military trainers 
into the Kingdom.75 
Saudi–American relations improved considerably after the Suez Crisis of 1956, 
when the U.S. prevented the British, French, and Israelis from seizing Egypt’s Suez 
Canal, fearing that these neo-imperialistic overtures would compel the region to seek the 
support of the Soviets.76  The crisis enhanced America’s image in the region, but also 
made the newly popular Nasser, the primary threat to the Kingdom.  The Saudis 
consequently renewed the American lease at Dhahran the following year.77  In 1958, after 
Syria and Egypt formed the United Arab Republic (UAR) and the revolution in Iraq 
ensued, Sa’ud desired to downplay his involvement with the Americans, in an effort to 
appease his more powerful Arab neighbors. This resulted in his refusal to renew the lease 
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of Dahran airbase in 1961.78  USMTM remained in place, though a large, high-visibility 
American military presence of indefinite duration would not return to the Kingdom until 
1990. 
The American military would return on occasion to the Kingdom for brief visits, 
however, especially if Saudi oil resources were in any way threatened.  In late 1962, 
when the Egyptians began attacking Saudi territory from bases in Yemen, the Saudis 
reversed course once again, pursuing an expanded U.S. Air Force “training mission” to 
be based in Jeddah.79  The Americans agreed, but insisted on basing their aircraft at 
Dhahran, near the oilfields, and much farther from the Yemeni border..80    
President John F. Kennedy’s primary concerns were the continued independence 
of the Kingdom and the security of its oilfields.81  Kennedy’s administration was also 
concerned with avoiding any conflict with Nasser, then considered an alternative to 
Soviet influence.  Thus, the Americans did not regard the Kingdom’s southern borders as 
a top priority for defense.  Pursuant to the Saudi’s request, the U.S. jet fighters arrived in 
July 1963, staying for approximately six months.82 
The Saudis, once again sensed peril, when President Jimmy Carter declined to 
intervene on behalf of the faltering regime of the Shah of Iran, formerly considered as 
having played a significant stabilizing role in the Persian Gulf since British withdrawal in 
1971.  The Saudis, having increased their oil production to stabilize prices during the 
crisis in Iran and to ensure regional stability, requested U.S. presence in the region.  
Carter complied by sending U.S. fighter jets to the Kingdom the following month, as a 
display of force.83 
The U.S. continued its efforts to offset Soviet influence in the region throughout 
the 1970s.  Though sometimes straining the U.S.–Saudi partnership, the Kingdom also 
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derived benefit from this.  This became especially apparent when the People’s Republic 
of Yemen and its Marxist regime was established directly to the south of the Kingdom.84  
Moreover, the Kingdom had disposable revenue from its lucrative oil industry and 
became a major financial contributor to various causes, including anti-Communist 
movements fighting U.S. wars of proxy.85 
Not all Saudi aid policies supported American preferences, however and 
sometimes even contradicted U.S. foreign policy.  One such instance was the Kingdom’s 
funding of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and other rejectionist Arab 
states, countering America’s mediation of an Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty in 1978–
1979.86  There were conversely, Saudi efforts made to appease U.S. foreign policy 
objectives, especially in its proxy war in Central America.    
During the 1980s, U.S. financial support for the Nicaraguan Contra rebels was cut 
off by Congress and a new source of funding was necessary for their continued fight 
against their leftist foes.  Reagan’s National Security Advisor, Robert McFarlane turned 
to Saudi Ambassador Bandar in May 1984 to fill the void, as a way to circumvent the 
rebels from being completely off.  The Saudis subsequently began transferring $1 million 
per month into a Miami bank account.  When this scandal came to light during the Iran-
Contra hearings, Bandar denied complicity outright.87 
B. THE ORIGINS OF TENSION 
1. The Oil Weapon 
The Cold War revitalized the U.S.–Saudi partnership and had the benefit of 
overshadowing a potential complication in the form of America’s connection to Israel.  
America’s relationship with Israel started behind the scenes in the 1940s, escalating to an 
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arms supply relationship in the mid-1960s, and becoming part of the anti-Soviet alliance 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s.88  Though the Saudis were not pleased with the 
American–Israeli connection, the Saudi’s displeasure had practically no effect in 
Washington.  The Arab–Israeli conflict, however, polarized the entire region, putting 
considerable pressure on states friendly to America.  These crises threatened the regime’s 
legitimacy, but, by the same token, also provided it with opportunities to assert its 
independence from American policy.  The regime’s challenged legitimacy and 
opportunities for independence resulted in the culmination of the oil embargo of 1973–
1974.89 
Reflecting Arab sentiment and the Kingdom’s special identity as the home of the 
holy places of Islam, namely Mecca and Medina, Saudi leaders stood opposed to a 
sovereign Jewish presence smack in the middle of the Arab world from the start.90  The 
Palestinian question was consistently a matter of contention, even before the first meeting 
between Saudi and American heads of state in 1945.91   
President Truman supported the UN General Assembly resolution of November 
29, 1947, which called for separate Jewish and Arab states in Palestine.92  By December,  
the King indicated that his own failure to withdraw Aramco’s oil concessions in response 
to the resolution, invited danger from Iraq and Transjordan.  The King requested 
assistance against such an eventuality, including weapons.  The U.S. government, 
however, was reluctant to provide the requested assistance.93   
The following year, soon after Israel’s declaration of independence, Aramco’s 
President warned Washington that the Saudis had threatened possible consequences 
affecting U.S. access to Saudi resources should the United States provide arms to the 
                                                 
88 Yergin, The Prize, 556. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Brown, Oil, God, and Gold,  181-85. 
91 Yergin, The Prize,  403-5. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Brown, Oil, God, and Gold,  188. 
 23
Israel.94  The Americans remained unaffected by the threat and did not alter its plans.  
The Saudis and other Arab oil exporters had made similar threats against the British and 
French during the 1956 Suez crisis, though there were no serious consequences as a 
result.95 
The crisis in 1967 fueled tensions with the Kingdom, once again as closer U.S.–
Israeli ties were seen negatively by Arabs throughout the region.  This put undue pressure 
on Saudi Arabia, as it was perceived as too dependent on the United States and not 
sufficiently supportive of Egypt.  Opposition to the ruling family raised the level of 
internal unrest, resulting in unprecedented violence.  The U.S. Embassy and USMTM 
facilities were bombed in June 1967 while Saudi Oil Minister Yamani threatened to 
nationalize the oil industry, as a warning to Aramco officials for U.S. support of Israel.96 
On June 6, 1967, the second day of the Arab–Israeli war, an Egyptian radio 
broadcast claimed that American and British carrier-based aircraft had attacked Egyptian 
airfields.97  Egypt and five other Arab states responded by immediately severing relations 
with both the U.S. and Britain.98  The next day, a series of demonstrations broke out in 
Saudi Arabia, and at a rally in Riyadh, King Faisal bin Abd al-Aziz (“Faisal”) proclaimed 
that the Kingdom would cut off oil supplies “to anyone who aided Israel.”99  A 
combination of labor actions and mob violence shut down Aramco’s operations, and 
Riyadh informed oil officials that no shipments to the U.S. or Britain would be 
allowed.100   
American, Venezuelan, Iranian, and Indonesian oil production ramped up output 
to fill the gap, and by early September 1967, the Arab producers gave up the embargo.101  
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Not until a few years later, when growing demand had outstripped America’s remaining 
spare oil production and the Arabs gained greater cooperation from other members of the 
OPEC cartel, did market realities create the opportunity for an effective deployment of 
the “oil weapon.”102 
In light of the 1967 War, the royal family received growing pressure from Arab 
radicals.  The Saudi royal family, hoping to resolve or at least lessen these tensions, 
continually urged the Americans to press Israel to withdraw to the pre-war lines.103  In 
December 1969, the Nixon administration responded to the Saudi’s request and 
announced an American peace plan, called the Rogers Plan, after then-Secretary of State 
William Rogers.104  The Israelis resisted the proposal, enabling the Americans to put 
some distance between themselves and Jerusalem, but accomplishing little else.105  
Eventually, in the face of growing Soviet support for the Egyptians, Rogers’ initiatives 
gave way to a more pro-Israeli policy.106 
The contradictions of the U.S.–Saudi relationship reached a breaking point in the 
crisis of 1973–1974, when senior officials in Washington openly threatened the seizure of 
Persian Gulf oil fields, either in Saudi Arabia or in neighboring Arab countries.107  The 
crisis also marked a decisive shift in the balance of relations in terms of oil.  Saudi Arabia 
emerged as the world’s “swing producer,” possessing the bulk of global spare production 
capacity, and thus the last word on any attempt to drive up prices through cutbacks.108 
From the outset of the crisis, Americans and Saudis stood on opposite sides. 
Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat’s earlier decisions to end the Arab–Israeli “War of 
Attrition” and then to expel Soviet forces had seemed to President Nixon and national 
security adviser Henry Kissinger, to validate their uncompromising Middle East policy. 
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To the Saudi royal family, Washington’s failure to reassess aid to Israel after the Soviet 
threat to the region subsided, amounted to a betrayal, and the Saudis consequently began 
providing weapons and aid to Sadat’s Egypt.109   
Faisal was gravely concerned with Arab alienation because of his continued U.S. 
support of Israel.  In May 1973, he warned ARAMCO officials that oil concessions were 
in jeopardy, expressing disappointment in American policy that polarized Israel against 
its “Arab friends.”  He further stated in a televised interview that, “America’s complete 
support for Zionism and stance against the Arabs makes it extremely difficult for us to 
continue to supply the United States with oil, or even to remain friends with the United 
States.”110  When Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s visited Riyadh in August 1973 to 
disclose his war plans, Faisal responded by offering unwavering financial support and 
executed his plan to use the “oil weapon.”111 
The coordinated Egyptian and Syrian surprise attacks of October 6, 1973 
strategically occurred on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, and also during a meeting of 
OPEC and oil company representatives in Vienna, Austria.  Unable to settle with the 
companies on oil prices, the exporters’ delegation adjourned to Kuwait City on October 
15, where they proclaimed a unilateral 70 percent hike.112  Saudi Arabia’s Oil Minister, 
Yamani told his colleagues, “This is a moment for which I have been waiting a long time. 
The moment has come. We are masters of our own commodity.”113 
The Arabs soon exercised their newfound power and mastery.  On October 17, the 
Arab oil ministers agreed to cut back production by 5 percent each month.  On October 
19, the U.S. Government announced an immediate, large-scale military aid package to 
Israel, in response to their pleas.  When Egyptian defeat seemed inevitable, the Arab 
exporters announced the suspension of all oil supplies to the United States, negatively 
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effecting America’s domestic life and economy.114  U.S. Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger subsequently made numerous diplomatic visits to the Middle East to facilitate 
an Egyptian–Israeli disengagement, while also visiting the Kingdom.  Once a resolution 
to the crisis was effectuated, in March 1974, the Saudis and most other Arab producers 
agreed to end the embargo.115 
The embargo illustrated to both countries, the limitations of the U.S.–Saudi 
relationship.  Each subsequent American administration recognized the potential for 
another disaster, and pursued its own Middle East peace plans.  The Saudis refrained 
from using the oil weapon in subsequent Israeli–Arab crises, apparently concerned about 
the effect of a renewed embargo on the long-term market for oil, given its harsh 
consequences for Western economies and the potential for the development of alternative 
energy sources.  Saudi policymakers instead strived to keep the price of oil at an 
acceptable level intended to maximize demand and revenues over time, a strategy limited 
only by OPEC’s share of world production and ability to cooperate.116 
2. U.S. Weapons Sales to the Kingdom 
The explosive growth of Saudi oil revenues in the 1970s enabled the Kingdom to 
purchase large quantities of advanced weaponry.117  This was especially vital to the 
Kingdom in light of the Iranian revolution and the ouster of the Shah, as well as the 
ensuing war between Iran and Iraq, which threatened shipping in the Gulf and tested the 
limits of Saudi air defense.  The Saudis focused efforts and money to build up the Royal 
Saudi Air Force (RSAF), selecting the United States as their main supplier.118  During 
the late 1970s and 1980s, Saudi Arabia increased the size of its air bases and port 
facilities to aid in U.S. power projection in the Gulf region, creating massive stockpiles of 
munitions and equipment, and building support facilities that could be used by U.S. 
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forces deploying to Saudi Arabia.  Saudi Arabia spent $16 billion on U.S. military 
construction services during this period, and additional billions for supervised military 
construction.119  The U.S.–Saudi relationship strengthened and presented a unified effort 
to confront threats in the region. 
When Iraq came under serious military pressure from Iran, beginning in 1983, the 
U.S. and Saudi Arabia cooperated closely in setting up combined air and naval defenses 
against Iran.120  The two countries conducted combined exercises, and cooperated in 
establishing the “Fahd Line,” which created an Air Defense Identification Zone and 
forward air defense system off the Saudi coast.121  This cooperation helped Saudi Arabia 
defend its air space and shoot down an Iranian F-4 that breached Saudi defenses on June 
5, 1984.122  The U.S. and Saudi Arabia have also jointly operated E-3A AWACS 
surveillance planes in Saudi Arabia ever since.123 
U.S. arms sales to the Kingdom dropped significantly in the late 1980s after 
Washington’s denial of key arms requests, though sales spiked significantly after Iraq 
invaded Kuwait in 1990, only to fall off again in the mid-1990s as a result of Persian Gulf 
War debt and decreased oil revenue.124  U.S. weapons sales to the Kingdom have 
exceeded $100 billion in the last fifty years, with over a quarter of the contracts signed in 
the 1990s .125  These sales figures not only include weapons, but also “associated support 
equipment, spare parts, support services, and construction.”126 
One source that inhibited arms sales to the Kingdom was the increasingly 
powerful pro-Israeli lobby, headed by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee 
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(AIPAC), which asserted that weapons supplied to Saudi Arabia could eventually be used 
against Israel.127  AIPAC employed a strategy of convincing members of the U.S. 
Congress to vote against any authorization to sell weapons to the Kingdom. The Saudis, 
lacking a credible lobby, sometimes circumvented Congress by working directly through 
the administration.  AIPAC was moderately successful in its efforts, however, as the 
prospective sale of F-15 fighters to the Kingdom was temporarily blocked in 1985.128  
The Saudis, hence sought other sources for weaponry, including Great Britain.129 
Additionally, Saudi Arabia was also denied access to Lance short-range surface-
to-surface missiles, the first in a series of setbacks in prospective sales of missiles of 
various types.130  This was especially disappointing for the Kingdom, as it had become 
increasingly vulnerable to Iranian missile capabilities.131  This compelled Saudi Arabia to 
seek other sources for missiles, which prompted King Fahd to secretly dispatch his U.S. 
Ambassador to Beijing in July 1985.132  The purpose of this visit was to convince the 
Chinese to sell Saudi Arabia Dong Feng-3A ballistic missiles.133  In late 1986 and 1987, 
the missile deal was finalized between the Chinese and the Saudis, resulting in a 
multibillion-dollar deal for an estimated fifteen mobile launchers and approximately fifty 
specially modified missiles designed to accommodate conventional warheads.134 
American satellite imagery revealed the missile deployment in early 1988.135  The 
Americans were shocked and outraged, and further embarrassed by Bandar’s 
involvement, who was the Saudi Ambassador to the United States.  In response to this, 
the Saudis justified their position by citing the threat Iran posed to Saudi Arabia, and the 
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U.S. denial of their original request for missiles and advanced F-15 jet fighters.136  While 
assuring the U.S. that the missiles were conventionally armed, the Saudis rejected all requests 
for inspections.137  The administration expressed its severe disappointment, pointing out to 
the Saudis that their new anti-Iranian weapons could provoke an unwanted conflict with 
Israel.138 
Riyadh was unfazed by the U.S. warning.  After the Reagan administration issued a 
forceful ultimatum to King Fahd, the U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia was recalled from his 
post.  This unprecedented move, reportedly undertaken at Saudi Ambassador Bandar’s 
urging, smoothed the path for an upcoming visit by U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz to 
promote the Reagan administration’s regional peace initiative.139  Saudi Ambassador 
Bandar apparently expressed satisfaction for his part in the Chinese weapons deal, as he 
blamed AIPAC for their meddling and was able to demonstrate Saudi determination in 
securing weapons from sources elsewhere.140 
The discord between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia was short-lived, however.  Within 
weeks of Shultz’s visit, the Saudis signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, effectively 
forfeiting any Saudi nuclear ambitions and quelling Israeli fear of a possible Saudi nuclear 
attack. Saudi Arabia also severed diplomatic ties with Iran; yhe U.S. recognized this positive 
Saudi gesture and approved planned arms sales.141  The Saudis had learned to overcome 
there dependency on U.S. weapons sales, just as they had with U.S. oil policy.  King Fahd 
further expressed that his intent was not political when it came time to purchase weapons and 
would be willing to purchase them from any country, regardless of its politics.142 
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After Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia signed several major contracts 
for American weapons systems.  And during the build-up of Operations Desert Shield 
and Desert Storm, Saudi officials allowed more than 500,000 U.S. military personnel into 
the Kingdom for fear that the Iraqis would also invade Saudi Arabia.143  Unprecedented 
U.S. weapons sales took place in 1993, with the Saudis signing a $7 billion contract for 
more than F-15s with advanced capabilities.144  Residual debt from the Persian Gulf War 
and declining oil revenues, forced the Saudis to renegotiate payments with the U.S. 
Government and American defense contractors.145  Weapons sales decreased to $4 
billion for 1993–1997 and to only $600 million in 1998–2001.146   
Large weapons sales to the Kingdom have proved profitable to American defense 
contractors and the U.S. economy overall   Regardless of these expenditures, and Saudi 
Arabia’s quest to seek weapons from whomever was willing to provided them, however, 
the U.S. remains the sole guarantor of its defense and security.147 
3. Western Forces Return  
When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, the Saudi Kingdom was 
surprised at the seemingly imminent threat that presented itself, especially since Saudi 
Arabia was wholly unprepared to defend itself against the vastly superior Iraqi military.  
An attack by an Arab neighbor was unprecedented for the Kingdom, save the occasional 
Yemeni nuisance, thus causing tremendous consternation for the regime.148  Though it 
appeared that the annexation of Saudi Arabia was unlikely, there was uncertainty about 
whether the Iraqis were planning to seize the valuable oil fields in the eastern al Hasa 
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region.149  Iraqi troops were already nearby in Kuwait and the Saudi’s top priority was to 
push the Iraqi troops back to their original borders.  King Fahd, again turned to Saudi 
Arabia’s ally, the United States, for the much needed assistance.150 
The Bush administration concurred with King Fahd that Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait 
posed a direct threat to the security of Saudi Arabia, as well as the overall global 
economy.151  Expediting the return of American forces to the Kingdom in large numbers 
was, therefore imperative, albeit a very delicate matter.  Within the same week, Secretary 
of Defense Dick Cheney briefed Fahd and his advisers in Riyadh and communicated the 
U.S. commitment to the Saudi’s defense, pledging to withdraw troops once victory was 
secured.152   
Orders were subsequently issued to begin the massive deployment of American 
and coalition forces to the Kingdom.  Advance teams were deployed and arrived the very 
next day.153  The goal was to move forces immediately to Saudi Arabia to deter an Iraqi 
attack on the Kingdom.  The plan required rapid movement of combat aircraft, naval 
forces, and air-deployable light ground forces to the Gulf.  It was imperative for the 
buildup of forces to happen as quickly as possible to produce a credible defense of Saudi 
Arabia.  Sea-deployable heavy ground forces were added as the deployment progressed, 
which took more time to arrive in theater.154  Interdiction at sea began immediately, as a 
result of the United Nations approval of UN Resolution 655, imposing economic 
sanctions against Iraq.155 
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In order to deter the unpredictable Iraqi forces, UN Coalition forces had to move 
to Saudi Arabia quickly, prepared to be self sufficient for one month.156  Expedited 
intelligence collection was necessary in order to track Iraqi troop movement.  The U.S. 
Air Force had an impressive airlift capacity and was able to transfer troops and 
equipment to the Kingdom to support forces already in position.  “During the first two 
days, 91 missions were flown to Saudi Arabia, and more than 70 missions were flown 
each day for the rest of the month.”157  Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) 
aircraft, and dedicated satellites were also employed to provide real-time intelligence to 
force commanders.158 
Additionally, U.S. Naval forces were redirected and concentrated off the Gulf to 
bolster the deterrent force.159  In anticipation of Fahd’s acceptance to receive U.S. forces, 
President Bush ordered two carrier battle groups to the Gulf, comprising more than 100 
fighters to reinforce the ships already on station at the onset of the crisis.160  Air and 
ground forces reached Saudi Arabian soil within forty-eight hours of the order.161  
Shortly thereafter, advance elements of the Egyptian army landed in Saudi Arabia, along 
with detachments from Morocco and Syria, comprising the first element of the Arab  
component.162  American prepositioned ships, located at Diego Garcia and Guam, were 
directed to the area and, by August 15, the 7th Marine Brigade already had its equipment 
on Saudi soil. 163 
General Schwarzkopf’s goal was to get as many ground troops into the theater as 
quickly as possible in preparation for a potential Iraqi attack.164  Supplies would follow 
soon thereafter, forcing the military units to rely on support from the host nation and the 
                                                 










supply-laden prepositioning ships.165  This approach was very risky indeed, especially 
since these initial forces were lightly equipped and could not necessarily defend the 
Kingdom effectively against the Iraqi heavy divisions that were reinforced with tanks and 
other armor.166 
The threat of an Iraqi armored invasion of the Kingdom existed until mid-
September, when Iraqi ground forces then assumed a more defensive posture.167  
Eventually, these armor units were replaced with infantry troops and the threat ultimately 
subsided.168  By September 14, Saddam had deployed to Kuwait ten divisions, more than 
two thousand tanks and armored personnel carriers and approximately seven hundred 
artillery pieces.169  Available reinforcements were also plentiful, with another twelve 
divisions of reinforcements and reserves assembled throughout Iraq.170  Military planners 
were still prepared for an Iraqi attack, albeit in reduced and limited form. 
Throughout Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, approximately 95 percent 
of materiel was moved by sea, and the remainder, by air.171  Tactical operations included 
the movement of equipment and troops within Saudi Arabia, which proved challenging.  
Though Saudi Arabia had a fairly modernized infrastructure, the absence of an efficient 
rail system forced the allies to rely on heavy equipment transporters, as well as 
essentially commandeering the few Saudi freeways that could withstand the transport of 
heavy loads, particularly in the north.172  By late September the allies had more than one 
hundred heavy equipment transporters in theater; and by the end of the conflict, the 
number had risen to 1,300, most of which were operated by foreign nationals.173  
                                                 










The efforts to deploy forces to the theater were monumental, with the air 
movement alone surpassing that of the Berlin Airlift in 1948–49.174  Within the first 
month, almost 40,000 soldiers and more than 30,000 tons of supplies were delivered by 
air.175  In comparison, during WWII, it took the U.S. more than two months, utilizing 
maritime sealift to transport approximately 30,000 troops to Europe.176  The U.S. Civil 
Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) provided aircraft for the first time in its twenty-eight-year 
history.177  The aircraft provided by CRAF were essential and acted as the primary means 
for movement of personnel into the theater, thereby contributing greatly to the overall 
airlift efforts.178  
Other Coalition forces were faced with similar logistical challenges. France 
deployed over 16,000 personnel and approximately 100 tons of freight during the first six 
months of Desert Shield.179   The French relied heavily on commercial aircraft, which 
posed its own set of problems.180  Consequently, after the war, the French decided to set 
up a fleet with capabilities similar to that of CRAF.181 
The British deployed approximately 45,000 personnel, their largest deployment 
since World War II and surpassing that of the Falklands war.182  Britain’s sealift fleet 
consisted mostly of foreign-flagged vessels due to the astronomical expense of chartering 
British-flagged ships, the meager size of Britain’s merchant fleet, and the lack of 
available ships for this endeavor.183  
Deploying the Coalition to the Gulf was indeed challenging and the build up of 
naval forces was necessary to enforce the economic sanctions imposed by U.N. 
                                                 











Resolution 655 against Iraq.184  Additional challenges existed with the need to monitor 
not only the Persian Gulf, but also the Red Sea and Arabian Sea, which encompassed 
250,000 square miles of salt water.185  By the end of the crisis, 165 ships from 19 
different countries had participated in the operation.186 
On November 8, 1990, President Bush announced an increase in U.S. forces to 
almost 500,000, including the authorization to activate up to 188,000 reservists.187  Over 
100,000 reservists ultimately served in the war, with 20 percent in theater.188  The U.S. 
was the only country that called up reservists in support of the war.189  The British 
augmented their deployed forces with personnel from other non-deploying units, while 
the French insisted on utilizing only professional, volunteer soldiers, avoiding the use of 
conscripts.190 
Bush’s decision to increase the troop strength to 500,000 introduced 
unprecedented logistical challenges.191  Allied forces in the region already numbered 
approximately 300,000 by mid-October (220,000 US and European, 40,000 Saudi, and 
42,000 non-Saudi Arab).192  Despite the impressive presence, most of the ground forces 
in the Kingdom were light forces.193  On the other hand, Iraqi forces in Kuwait, were 
estimated at 400,000 and credible defenses along the border had been established.194  
Superior Western air and naval superiority practically assured a worthy defense of 
Saudi Arabia, but the force assembled was not sufficient to displace Saddam’s forces in 
                                                 












Kuwait without the risk of heavy Western casualties.195  Units from Europe would 
ultimately be employed, despite the absence of a provision in the contingency planning 
providing for such units.196  Movement of forces from Europe required close cooperation 
with German and other allied governments for exclusive use of their transportation 
nodes.197 
On November 28, the United Nations passed Resolution 678, authorizing 
members to use “all means necessary” to force the withdrawal of Iraqi forces—if Iraq did 
not voluntarily leave Kuwait by 15 January.”198  UN 678 read, in part, as follows:   
The resolution is an update of Security Council resolution 660 and 
ultimately gives authorization for invasion…Authorizes Member States ... 
to use all necessary means to bring Iraq into compliance with previous 
Security Council resolutions if it did not do so by 15 January 1991.199 
UN Resolution 678 provided the Coalition forces with the authority to employ 
transportation nodes wherever necessary.  Additionally, the Resolution imposed an 
implicit deadline for reinforcements to be in Saudi Arabia, prepared to launch an 
offensive, which came to be known as Operation Desert Storm.200  
Saudi Arabia’s involvement was also commendable, as it commanded both Arab 
task forces, specifically the Joint Forces Command (East) and Joint Forces Command 
(North).201  Saudi forces were organized under the command of Lt. General Prince 
Khalid Bin Sultan al-Sa’ud.202  The Arab task forces reported to Prince Khalid through a 
Joint Forces Command in the Saudi Ministry of Defense, and were divided into a Joint 
Forces Command (North), a Joint Forces Command (East), and a Joint Forward Forces 
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Command Ar’Ar (the command of the Arab defensive forces responsible for screening 
the border area).203  The Ar’Ar command was subordinated to the Joint Forces Command 
(North).  The Ar’Ar command included two Saudi National Guard battalions, a Saudi 
Army airborne battalion, and a Pakistani armored brigade with about 5,500 men, over 
100 tanks, and about 90 other additional armored Saudi Arabia and Alliances in the 
Gulf.204 
Though the triumphant war to defend the Arabian Peninsula and liberate Kuwait 
marked a high point for the U.S.–Saudi Alliance, the Gulf War had created a challenge to 
the legitimacy of the ruling family.  After inordinate expenditures on defense 
preparedness, which had resulted in a drain on their economy, the Saudi military still had 
remained incapable of standing up to Saddam’s forces.205  King Fahd had denounced the 
Iraqi invasion and stated that the U.S. military presence was necessary, though only 
temporary.206  Fahd had appealed to other Arab countries for support, but the necessary 
force to establish a credible deterrent against Saddam’s forces, validated the Kingdom’s 
dependency on the United States.207     
Prior to Desert Shield, General Schwarzkopf and his staff agonized over the effect 
that an overwhelming influx of foreigners would have on social, cultural and religious 
life of Saudi Arabia.208  Schwarzkopf recounted that, “their [Saudi’s] most pressing 
concern was neither the threat from Saddam nor the enormous joint military enterprise on 
which we were embarked.  What loomed largest for them was the cultural crisis triggered 
by this sudden flood of Americans into their kingdom.”209 
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Intensive public debate over the massive arrival of military forces indeed ensued 
in the Kingdom.210  The fall of 1990 was filled with heated discussions that, in the past, 
had been confined to private domains.211  The debate revolved around several issues, 
with some related to the Gulf War and others, challenging the political system and the 
legitimacy of the regime.212  Particular turbulence stemmed from the fact that American 
troops were on Saudi soil and the realization of the reliance of the Kingdom on the U.S. 
for its security.213  As predicted by General Schwarzkopf, Saudi citizens were 
overwhelmed with the magnitude of U.S. troop presence and felt a deep sense of 
humiliation that was attributed to Saudi government mismanagement of its economy and 
military.214  Furthermore, though the American presence was deemed a necessary evil, 
many regarded this presence as a mockery of Islamic principles.215  
The group most opposed to the legitimacy of the regime was composed of the 
rank and file religious scholars.216  Sermons at the mosques highlighted the weakness of 
the regime evidenced by its reliance on “infidels” to defend the holy land of Islam.217  
This scrutiny also challenged whether it was acceptable to invite non-Muslims to kill other 
Muslims.218 
In September 1990, the dean of the Islamic College at Umm al-Qura University in 
Mecca, Dr. Safar al-Hawali, released a tape highly critical of the regime questioning whether the 
al Sa’ud were worthy of calling themselves a legitimate Islamic government.219  Al-Hawali 
further concluded that the true enemy of Islam was not the Iraqis, but rather, the West.220  
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Al-Halawi subsequently distributed pamphlets calling attention to the increased 
dependency of the Saudi Arabian government and overall society, on the West.221  He 
chided the Gulf War as an opportunity for foreign, non-Muslim domination and 
intervention of the Islamic world and, though not a supporter of the Iraqi aggression, al-
Halawi opposed the regime, making reference to the U.S. as “an evil greater than 
Saddam.”222 
Other scholars joined Dr. al-Halawi and came into the fray, denouncing the West 
and its intervention during the crisis, further sharpening their rhetoric against the Saudi 
government.223  The ruling family was continually chastised for destroying Muslim unity 
by relying on the West.224  The Gulf War provided a venue for the opinionated scholars, 
as there were an estimated 1,500 foreign correspondents in the Kingdom covering the 
war. Other repressed groups, such as “Women Desirous of Reform,” also joined in to 
voice their discontent.225  The perceived Western encroachment was seen as further 
deterioration of Muslim society.226 
The danger from Iraq persisted, nevertheless, as Saddam still possessed a 
powerful army, and despite U.S. Secretary of Defense Cheney’s pledge to withdraw 
forces after the war, Western forces remained in the Kingdom. Furthermore, there was a 
high level of Saudi discontent with this Western presence and no formal agreement 
regarding their status.227  Not only did the Western forces remain, fueling the Saudis’ 
growing discomfort, but their presence became informally established under the guise of 
the “dual containment” of Iran and Iraq.228  The terms of the enforcement of the “no-fly 
zone” over southern Iraq by British and American warplanes was also a matter of 
particular sensitivity. 
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The priority assigned to Saudi–American relations declined substantially with the 
1993 inauguration of President Bill Clinton.  In Middle Eastern affairs, Clinton was 
mostly preoccupied with Arab–Israeli peacemaking. His administration’s overriding 
policy interest was the health of the domestic economy and for Saudi Arabia, this meant a 
focus on trade issues, such as the purchase of civilian airliners and later, oil prices. 
Bandar’s standing in Washington declined accordingly.229  His special value to American 
officials also appeared to decline after the incapacitation of his patron, King Fahd, who 
suffered from poor health.230   
Because the focus of the Clinton Administration had shifted to domestic politics 
and the quest to facilitate improved negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians, 
there was a reduced attentiveness to the Saudis.  The U.S. was seemingly insensitive to 
the continual presence of U.S. and British troops on Saudi soil, which manifested itself 
into increased terrorist attacks directed at Westerners. Terrorist bombings at a Saudi 
Arabian National Guard (SANG) training site in Riyadh killed seven people in November 
1995, including five U.S. military personnel.  The Khobar Towers housing facility in 
Dhahran was also bombed in June 1996, resulting in the deaths of 19 U.S. airmen.  This 
prompted Western military forces to consolidate its personnel at the Prince Sultan Air 
Base, near Riyadh for improved security.231 
Following the Riyadh and Dhahran attacks, Saudi law enforcement involvement 
to apprehend the perpetrators was not sufficiently proactive, causing its condemnation in 
Washington.232  Likewise, Saudi Arabia did not appear supportive of fervent U.S. efforts 
to stem the tide of increasing terrorism in the Middle East.  In 1996, after the Americans 
persuaded the Sudanese government to expel Saudi dissident, Osama bin Laden, Saudi 
Arabia refused his extradition.233  As the mastermind of al-Qa’ida, bin Laden had 
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declared war on both the Saudi royal family and the United States on the grounds that the 
foreign, non-Muslim military presence desecrated holy Islamic soil.234  Because of Saudi 
Arabia’s refusal to apprehend bin Laden, he traveled freely to Afghanistan, where the 
United States and Saudi Arabia had supported the Muslim guerilla fighters there in their 
quest to oust the Soviet occupiers. 
After the Soviets left Afghanistan in defeat, the Saudis continued to support the 
theocratic Taliban government, which governed Afghanistan after 1996.235  Saudi 
sponsorship of the Taliban continued, though bin Laden, who had been divested of Saudi 
citizenship, accepted their hospitality.236  The al-Qa’ida bombings of the U.S. embassies 
in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, prompted the Saudis to work jointly with the 
U.S. to secure the capture of bin Laden..237  The U.S. attempted to kill bin Laden in 
retaliation for the bombing through the use of ship-launched cruise missiles, though they 
were unsuccessful and he remains at large to date.238 
In hindsight, the mistrust and lack of coordination between the U.S. and Saudi 
Arabia was costly.  Viewed differently, the tensions arising from the indefinite U.S. and 
British military presence in Saudi Arabia, and the seeming inability of Washington and 
Riyadh to join forces against bin Laden, provided the source for both bin Laden’s anti-
Saudi, and anti-American agenda.   
4. More Dilemmas  
The Clinton administration’s efforts to keep the peace talks going between the 
Israelis and the Palestinians was deemed as a noble and sincere attempt to resolve, or at 
least, make progress towards an overall solution.239  The U.S.–Saudi Alliance suffered 
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new tensions however, with the breakdown of the Israeli–Palestinian peace process and 
the beginning of the second intifada in September 2000.240 
When George W. Bush assumed the presidency in 2001, he sought to improve ties 
between the two nations, despite the substantial deterioration of the alliance due to the 
fighting between Israelis and Palestinians, and the increased anti-American sentiment in 
the Middle East.  Bush, seeking to follow in his father’s footsteps attempted to rebuild he 
relationship. 
The Bush family and the Saudi royals had a formidable friendship, mainly due to 
the former President, George H. W. Bush and his commitment to defend Saudi Arabia, as 
demonstrated in 1990.  This familial connection seemed to offer hope to Riyadh for a 
renewal of the relationship between the two countries.  Likewise encouraging was 
George W. Bush’s background in the oil industry and recognition of the importance of 
U.S.–Saudi relations.   
The first Bush administration had protested Israel’s expansion of Jewish 
settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and was instrumental in bringing the 
Israeli government to the peace table at Madrid.241  President George W. Bush also 
recruited two senior officials from his father’s administration, Vice President Dick 
Cheney and Secretary of State Colin Powell for his own cabinet, putting the Saudis at 
ease, given their previous, favorable relationship.242 
Bush after all, had emerged as the “Arab” candidate, while his Democratic 
opponent, Al Gore, chose Senator Joseph Lieberman, an Orthodox Jew, as his running 
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voters during the second televised Presidential debate, and won a majority of their 
votes.244  The optimism and euphoria dissipated, however once George W. Bush assumed 
office. 
Despite the optimism surrounding the Bush presidency, tensions mounted 
between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, in part due to the continuing informal arrangements 
governing the U.S. and British military presence in Saudi Arabia.  Problems between the 
U.S. and Saudi were exacerbated in February 2001, when the allies launched an air raid 
from Prince Sultan Air Base against targets in Baghdad.245  The failure of the Allies to 
notify the Saudis before the air raid caused major consternation.246  As a consequence, 
the Saudis imposed operational restrictions on allied warplanes operating out of Prince 
Sultan Airbase, forbidding them to conduct further offensive operations against Iraq.247   
The Saudi Interior Minister Prince again emphasized the Saudi government’s 
desire to assert its exclusive sovereignty in matters related to hosting foreign forces, 
disallowing the extradition of suspects held in the Khobar Towers bombing case, stating, 
“no other entity has the right to try or investigate any crimes occurring on Saudi 
lands.”248  This assertion further added to U.S. Saudi tensions. 
Public attention was diverted from the tensions between the U.S. and Saudi 
Arabia, by the Palestinian intifada.  By disrupting the Middle East peace process, the 
Palestinian intifada brought to a conclusion the adversely affected, American post-Cold 
War experiment, which had sought to balance relations with both Jewish and Arab 
allies.249  Changing demographics, coupled with Arabic-language satellite television 
news, and the introduction of the internet to the Kingdom, mobilized the repressed, 
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thereby putting more pressure on the Saudi leadership.250  The Kingdom’s youth, 
learning of Israeli military actions against the Palestinians, directed their rage at the U.S., 
widely perceiving Americans as staunch Israeli allies, and harboring resentment over al 
Sa’ud’s ties with the United States.251   
The U.S. was conflicted with the pressure asserted by Israel to defend its citizens 
against terrorist attacks, and the Saudi insistence that they intervene forcefully against 
Israel’s violent incursions into the territories.252  The conflict of interests adversely 
affected Saudi’s public opinion of America.253  In the meantime, the Saudis pledged $225 
million dollars in aid to the Palestinian Authority in 2001.254 
Unable to balance this situation, the Bush administration shifted from one stance 
to another, seeking to appease both Saudi Arabia and Israel.  President Bush would 
consistently shun Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat, while frequently inviting Israeli 
Prime Minister Sharon for consultations at the White House.255  Crown Prince Abdullah 
retaliated by refusing continual invitations to Washington, though he communicated via 
correspondence, continuing to insist that Bush restrain Israel.256 
Abdullah eventually turned to brinkmanship and, from behind closed doors, 
dispatched Bandar to threaten a break in the formerly close relationship with the U.S.257  
Abdullah indicated that he had no intention of allowing himself to become “the next Shah 
of Iran.”258 
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Bush finally drafted a communiqué to the Abdullah pledging his commitment to 
the establishment of a Palestinian state.  According to one account, Abdullah shared 
Bush’s letter and the text of his own original complaint with fellow Arab leaders, 
including Yasser Arafat, whom he summoned to Riyadh.259  The Saudis responded to 
Bush, attaching a letter from Arafat pledging to fulfill Bush’s requirements for restarting 
the peace talks, and returned their ambassador to Washington.260 
Progress that had been made to date was violently disrupted by the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, which created a new set of circumstances for the 
tumultuous U.S.–Saudi partnership.  Israel and the Palestinians nevertheless stayed on 
course with the Saudi agenda.  Moreover, Israel and Palestine achieved even greater 
importance to the U.S., as its inability to facilitate a peaceful resolution was viewed as an 
impediment to Arab support for conducting its war in Afghanistan and Iraq.  9/11 also 
caused Americans to empathize with Israelis, as they, too had been attacked by Arabs.261  
On the Bush administration’s revised agenda, the Global War on Terrorism achieved a 
higher level of precedence, surpassing conflict resolution in the Middle East.262 
5. The Saudis Attempt Peace 
In March 2002, Abdullah offered his own peace proposal at an Arab League 
summit in an attempt to resolve the Palestinian issue, devoid of U.S. efforts.263  The 
peace proposal was similar to a suggestion offered by a journalist of the New York Times. 
The columnist, Thomas Friedman had proposed that the entire Arab League offer Israel 
“full peace” and security guarantees in exchange for a withdrawal to the June 4, 1967 
lines.264  Abdullah also acquiesced and finally accepted an invitation to the United States, 
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offered by U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney while visiting the Gulf region that March.265  
Cheney had been trying to muster support for the impending war in Iraq and offered his 
encouragement on the Israeli–Palestinian front.266 
Abdullah refrained for revealing too much of the plan before the Beirut Summit, 
only stating, “Arabs would be offering Israel additional incentives to make peace with its 
neighbors.”267  The consensus Arab League plan that emerged from Beirut featured a 
demand for Israel’s affirmation of the “achievement of a just solution to the Palestinian 
Refugee problem to be agreed upon in accordance with UN General Assembly 
Resolution 194,” which was interpreted by the Arabs as providing for a right of return.268  
Palestinian Authority representatives quickly highlighted that this language approximated 
the Palestinian position at Camp David in July 2000.269 
As the Beirut Summit was commencing, terrorist bombings in Israel threatened to 
derail these efforts.270  The Israeli response to the terrorist bombing included a major 
offensive against Palestinian bases in cities of the West Bank, which prompted public 
outcry throughout the Arab world.271  Though the summit proceeded, Prince Abdullah no 
longer offered the proposal and instead denounced Israeli violence in the territories.  The 
U.S. had also received assurances that Arafat would not be harmed and conveyed this to 
Abdullah.272  Though the Israelis provided safety for Arafat, they essentially ignored 
Bush’s demand for an immediate withdrawal from the territories. 273 
The Beirut Summit, though noble in its intent, proved to be highly embarrassing for the 
Saudi government and continued violent Israeli incursions into Palestinian cities only galvanized 
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Arabs throughout the world to protest the inaction of their governments and solidify their hatred 
of Israel.  A spate of suicide attacks against Israeli citizens continued, and, despite U.S. efforts to 
implore the Saudi government to pressure Arafat to cease support of these “martyrdom 
operations,” it was clear that continued U.S. support of Israel had caused a rift with the Saudis, 
making any Arab concession difficult to secure.274 
Despite the chain of events, Abdullah proceeded with a scheduled visit to 
President Bush’s Texas ranch.  It was rumored, through the media, that the division 
between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia was irreparable, and that the potential for use of the 
Saudi “oil weapon” was likely. 275  Abdullah dispelled these rumors, though he acknowledged 
that their two countries were at a crossroads, with the relationship severely damaged.276  The 
Saudis then presented the Americans with a proposal outlining a plan for an Israeli–Palestinian 
ceasefire and a follow-on agreement, utilizing the guidelines of the Beirut Declaration.277   
Prior to Abdullah’s departure, the Americans persuaded the Israelis to allow 
Yasser Arafat to leave his encircled compound in Ramallah, affording the Crown Prince 
to claim success.278  Despite this face-saving opportunity, another wave of suicide 
bombings occurred in June and President Bush responded by offering American support 
for a Palestinian state, while demanding the ouster of Arafat.279  Though the Saudi royals 
were supportive of this gesture, they insisted that Arafat had been elected, based on the 
will of his people.280  
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6. Saudi–U.S. Relations in the Wake of 9/11 
The terrorist attacks on the United States, which occurred on September 11, 2001, 
were boldly executed by a group of nineteen Arabs loyal to Osama bin Laden, of which 
fifteen were Saudis.281  The terrorist attack greatly affected regional politics and dealt a 
stunning blow to the U.S.–Saudi Alliance.  The immediate reaction of large segments of 
the Saudi and other Arab publics consisted of spontaneous celebrations.282  The Saudis 
stabilized oil prices, and then severed official relations with the Taliban, as the United 
States prepared to prosecute its war in Afghanistan.283   
Resentment for what had happened throughout that year impeded Saudi support 
for U.S. efforts against the Taliban and al-Qa’ida.  Anticipating public outcry for the U.S. 
efforts to kill a somewhat folkloric figure, namely Osama bin Laden and to oust the 
Taliban, who were considered a favorable theocratic government by the Arabs, media 
coverage of the American war effort was minimally exposed.284  Saudi officials refused 
to allow the Kingdom as a launching pad for attacks against other Arab countries and that 
“permission to do so would not be considered.”285  U.S. officials were careful to praise 
the Saudis for their continued cooperation, reiterating that American military 
commanders would respect Saudi desires.286 
Balancing Saudi and U.S. goals proved tricky and ultimately unsuccessful.  In 
September, Air Force Lieutenant General Charles Wald arrived to the Kingdom to 
assume his role as head of air operations at the recently completed Combined Air  
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Operations Center (CAOC) at Prince Sultan Air Base.287  The Saudi royals had not yet 
offered their approval for any air operations, unless the U.S. was prepared to comply with 
their restrictions.288  Securing Saudi cooperation against al-Qa’ida financial support and 
other efforts also proved difficult, as several media reports corroborated this.289 
In the meantime, a level of anger not seen since the Oil Embargo of 1973–74, 
consumed many Americans.  Pervasive cynicism permeated media and political circles, 
as the Saudis were perceived as not being sufficiently proactive in curtailing terrorist 
activity.  Furthermore, anti-American rhetoric was on the rise in Saudi Arabia and 
suspicions arose that the Saudis were encouraging this rhetoric to displace the hostility 
their subjects harbored towards their own government.290  Other topics brought about in 
the media included the antiquity of Saudi society and their regimented belief system, 
especially their maltreatment of women.291  Americans were also reminded of their  
archenemy’s origins when they learned that members of the bin Laden family residing in 
the United States had been airlifted home en masse at the request of the Saudi 
government.292   
Likewise, Saudi anger was equally fervent, as there were many U.S. policies 
vehemently opposed by the general Arab public.  Aside from the obvious opposition to 
Israeli actions against the Palestinians, they were also protesting U.S. military action in 
Afghanistan, which had resulted in the capture of Arabs, subsequently jailed in 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.293  Saudis also boycotted American products, reduced tourist 
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travel to the United States and divested billions of dollars.294  Bombing attacks in the 
Kingdom continued, killing more American and British expatriates.295 
American officials sought to publically reiterate the sincerity of Saudi 
cooperation, while assuaging Saudi leaders that the views expressed in the U.S. news 
media did not represent the position of the U.S. Government.296  Saudi officials 
dismissed these editorialized criticisms as a Jewish ploy to discredit Arabs, as they 
perceived  that Jews controlled the media.297 
Tensions reached a new plane after President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union 
address, where he identified countries that comprised the “axis of evil,” including Iran 
and Iraq.298 Reports surfaced that U.S. forces might be ejected from Saudi Arabia 
because of their unwillingness to support U.S. war efforts against another Arab country.  
There were also reports that Qatar was ready to receive U.S. forces at their newly 
constructed CAOC at the Al Udeid Air Base.299  A media leak further reported that Saudi 
Arabia would not be the base of operations.300  Following another leak, which revealed 
that a consultant had delivered a briefing to a Pentagon advisory panel describing the Saudi 
Arabia as an enemy of the United States, Saud al-Faisal, the Saudi Foreign Minister, once again 
explicitly ruled out the use of Saudi bases against Iraq.301 
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7. Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Departure of U.S. Military Forces  
After Coalition victory in 1991, a few thousand U.S. troops had indeed stayed on 
to enforce the United Nations Security Council Resolution 688, which justified the no-fly 
zones over Iraq in Operation Southern Watch.302  The UN resolution read in part, 
The resolution condemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian population, 
including a clause to protect Kurdish refugees on the Turkish border.  The 
no-fly zone in northern Iraq was not explicit in the resolution, but it was 
regarded that in order to protect both ground troops entering the area and 
airdrops of aid to the Kurdish population, a no-fly zone over the area was 
implied in northern Iraq.  The resolution insists that Iraq allow 
international humanitarian organizations immediate access to all people in 
need of assistance and make available all necessary facilities for their 
operations.  The resolution requests the Secretary-General pursue his 
humanitarian efforts in Iraq and report on the troubles of the Iraqi civilian 
population, in particular the Kurdish population and the suffering from 
repression inflicted by the Iraqi authorities.303 
Throughout Operation Southern Watch, the Saudis did not object to small-scale 
U.S. responses to Iraqi aircraft or air defense units challenging allied aircraft conducting 
these over flights. Saudi authorities, however, continued to be opposed to large-scale 
allied military action against Iraqi targets.304 
Saudi Arabia had already declared its opposition to a U.S. attack on another Arab 
country, and on March 19, 2003, at the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, King Fahd 
further reiterated that Saudi Arabia “will not participate in any way in the war.” Several 
news reports indicated however, that Saudi Arabia informally agreed to provide logistical 
support to U.S.-led forces, and granted permission to conduct refueling, reconnaissance,  
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surveillance, and transport missions from bases in Saudi Arabia.305  This informal 
support also included landing and over flight clearances as well as the use of a U.S.-built 
facility in Saudi Arabia, known as the Combat Air Operations Center (CAOC) to 
coordinate military operations in the region.306  
Similarly, on March 8, 2003, Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan bin Abd al 
Aziz announced that his government was allowing U.S. troops to use two airports in 
northern Saudi Arabia for “help in a technical matter.”307  Subsequent press releases 
indicated that the Kingdom had a wider role in the war than had been previously 
publicized.308  Additionally, the Saudi royal family further supported U.S. efforts by 
permitting the staging of special forces personnel from inside Saudi Arabia and allowing 
“some 250-300 transport and surveillance planes to fly missions from Saudi Arabia; and, 
providing tens of millions of dollars in discounted oil, gas, and fuel for U.S. forces.”309 
In September 2003, despite these informal arrangements for the logistical support 
and use of Saudi facilities, the United States ended its thirteen-year residual military 
presence in Saudi Arabia, apparently succumbing to a well-known demand of Osama bin 
Laden and hard-line Islamic groups across the Middle East, though U.S. and Saudi 
officials were quick to say “the pullout was not due to this.”310  But bin Laden had 
publicly decried the U.S. presence as early as 1994 and, in 1996, he disseminated a public 
condemnation entitled “Declaration of Jihad,” stating,  
the greatest disaster to befall the Muslims since the death of the Prophet 
Muhammad, is the occupation of Saudi Arabia, which is the cornerstone 
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home of the Noble Ka’ba where Muslims direct their prayers.  Despite 
this, it is occupied by the armies of Christians, the Americans and their 
allies.311  
It was clear that mounting pressure due to the complications caused by internal 
dissent within the Kingdom, as well as the greater Muslim world, had simply pressured 
the ruling family into this decision.  Furthermore, U.S. political and military pressure 
influenced this decision, too as the Saudis were constraining Western forces and their 
ability to prosecute the wars effectively in both Afghanistan and Iraq.   
This military presence had once peaked at more than 500,000 American troops, 
after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990.312  By the time U.S. forces departed 
Prince Sultan Air Base at Al Kharj in 2003, their numbers amounted to approximately 
5,000 personnel, with over 200 planes.313  The only U.S. military personnel remaining in 
the Kingdom were the 400 or so troops at various facilities throughout Saudi Arabia, 
comprising the USMTM, with the mission, “to provide maximum assistance in the 
development of the Armed Forces of Saudi Arabia into an effective combat force capable 
of defending the Kingdom against potential enemies.”314  The USMTM has maintained 
that role since 1953.315   Additionally, the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command 
(USASAC) continued to administer PM-SANG, which seeks to “develop, within the 
Saudi Arabian National Guard the capability to unilaterally initiate, sustain and operate 
modern military organizations and systems.”316   
According to USASAC modernization, support under a PM-SANG mission is, 
“open-ended and includes training, supply, maintenance, operations, medical, 
construction, equipment fielding, equipment post-fielding support and a host of other 
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related activities.”317  This program was chartered by, and operates according to, the 
terms of the 1973 memorandum of understanding.318  The Vinnell Corporation, a 
subsidiary of the Northrup Grumman Corporation, is the primary U.S. contractor charged 
with training SANG units.319  In 2004, terrorists shot and killed an American Vinnell 
employee based in Riyadh.320   
In anticipation of the redeployment in 2003, the U.S. sought a new location for its 
forces.  Qatar had already built Al Udeid Air Base in 1996 at the cost of more than $1 
billion.321  Qatar did not have an air force at the time, but wanted to encourage the United 
States military to base its aircraft there.322  The U.S. Air Force also built a backup air 
command center at Al Udeid, which could be used to run an air campaign if the Saudis 
did not let the Americans direct combat operations from the Prince Sultan base.323  The 
Qatari government pledged to allow a wider range of military operations than was 
permitted by the U.S. agreement with the Saudi Arabia.324  Hence, it was decided that the 
new Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) would be moved from Saudi Arabia to Al 
Udeid, which could accommodate 10,000 troops and more than 120 planes.325  The 
forward USCENTCOM headquarters was also to be located in Doha, Qatar.326 
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8. Saudi Arabia and Terrorism 
As with Sunni Muslim-led regimes in the Gulf region, Saudi leaders and its 
citizens were alarmed about the growth of Iranian influence in the region and the 
influence of the empowerment of Iraq’s Shiite majority population on Sunni-Shiite 
politics outside of Iraq.  The escalation of sectarian violence in Iraq since early 2006, 
which, in part was due to more assertive Iranian foreign policies, proved challenging to 
domestic support for the Saudi government’s policy of restraint from intervention in Iraq. 
Influential figures and religious scholars in Saudi Arabia were now calling for 
their government and fellow citizens to provide direct political and security assistance to 
Iraq’s Sunni Arab community, and to confront what they perceived as Iranian-led Shiite 
ascendance in the region.327  One prominent example of this trend appeared in a 
dramatically worded editorial published in the Washington Post on November 29, 
2006.328    Nawaf Obaid, a well-known Saudi security analyst and consultant to the Saudi 
government, stated that it was justified to support the Sunni minority in Iraq.329  The 
editorial created an instant debate about Saudi Arabia’s intentions toward Iraq, in spite of 
an attached disclaimer indicating that its conclusions did not represent Saudi policy.  
Obaid stated in relevant part,  
To turn a blind eye to the massacre of Iraqi Sunnis would be to abandon 
the principles upon which the Kingdom [of Saudi Arabia] was founded. It 
would undermine Saudi Arabia’s credibility in the Sunni world and would 
be a capitulation to Iran’s militarist actions in the region. To be sure, Saudi 
engagement in Iraq carries great risks — it could spark a regional war. So 
be it. The consequences of inaction are far worse.330 
Thus, suspicions became rampant about Saudi support for Sunnis in Iraq.  In 
2006, as the fighting in Iraq assumed a more inter-sectarian tone involving Sunni against 
Shi’a, Saudi concerns were heightened as they felt a compelling allegiance to their Sunni 
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brethren.  Religious scholars in the Kingdom called for global Sunni support of the 
minority Sunnis in Iraq claiming that the West was in collusion with the Iranians to quell 
Sunni influence in the region.331  Saudi Salafi activists also issued edicts, or fatwas 
declaring that the Shi’a were non-Muslims, which only served to heighten regional 
tensions.332 
The events of 9/11 also changed the way Saudi Arabia was viewed, due to their 
perceived involvement in supporting terrorist organizations.  Fifteen of the nineteen 9/11 
hijackers were Saudi citizens, which caused grave concern for the U.S. Government, 
prompting a higher level of scrutiny of Saudi involvement..333  Thereafter, the U.S. 
Government insisted that the Saudi Government take a more active role in counter-
terrorism.334 
In addition to the perceived failure of Saudi Arabia to identify the terrorists, it was 
also important to highlight other issues of terrorism that might cause the U.S. 
Government to question the terrorist’s alliance with Saudi Arabia.  Events leading up to 
the U.S. Government’s concerns persisted, despite the Saudi’s claim to renounce 
terrorism.   
Various press reports indicated that private Saudi citizens were giving millions of 
dollars to Sunni insurgents in Iraq, ultimately funding arms purchases, although Saudi 
government officials denied such reports.335  When interviewed by journalists, several 
truck drivers described how they would transport boxes of cash, from Saudi Arabia into 
Iraq, to support the insurgents.336 
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Senior Iraqi officials further indicated that most of the Saudi money had come 
from private donations, called zaqat, collected for Islamic causes and charities337.  This 
was considered a reliable source of funding, as Zaqat is considered one of the five 
Islamic principles that followers are required to abide by.338   
This Islamic pillar is outlined in the Qur’an, as follows: 
The obligatory nature of Zaqat is firmly established in the Qur’an, the 
Sunnah (or hadith), and the consensus of the companions and the Muslim 
scholars. Allah states in Surah at-Taubah verses 34-35: “34: O ye who 
believe! there are indeed many among the priests and anchorites, who in 
Falsehood devour the substance of men and hinder (them) from the way of 
Allah. And there are those who bury gold and silver and spend it not in the 
way of Allah. Announce unto them a most grievous penalty. 35: On the 
Day when heat will be produced out of that (wealth) in the fire of Hell, 
and with it will be branded their foreheads, their flanks, and their backs.— 
This is the (treasure) which ye buried for yourselves: taste ye, then, the 
(treasures) ye buried!” (The Holy Qur’an 9:34-35).339 
Though Saudis knew the purpose behind Zaqat, many gave blindly to Muslim 
clerics, who in turn, funneled these donations to Iraq.340  Large donations were also 
collected from Muslims during their pilgrimage to Mecca, though the end user was 
typically not revealed.341 
In one case, over $20 million in Saudi money was transferred to an Iraqi Sunni 
cleric who used the money to purchase weapons from the black market, including anti- 
aircraft missiles from Romania.  A high-ranking Saudi general denied the money transfer 
and stated, “There isn’t any organized terror finance, and we do not permit any such 
unorganized acts.” 342 
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In an effort to join in the fight against terrorism, the Saudi’s curtailed illicit Saudi 
charity donations by imposing strict regulations on donations and having the charity 
organizations consolidate their funds in a single bank account licensed by the government 
and from which cash withdrawals were banned.343  Non-resident individuals or 
corporations could no longer open bank accounts without the Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Agency’s (“SAMA”) approval.344  Ultimately, financing from Saudi charities resulted in 
a decrease in funding to the Sunni insurgency in Iraq.   
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At its inception, like most marital relationships, the partnership between the 
United States and Saudi Arabia was easily defined and the rationale was clear.  After 
World War II, the Saudi Kingdom’s vast oil reserves and willingness to use its 
production capacity to ensure moderate and stable world oil prices, were deemed by 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration (“FDR”) to be vital to American national 
security.345  In return for these strategic assets, the United States pledged to protect the 
Kingdom’s oil supplies and obstruct those who would seek to control them, primarily the 
Soviet Union.346  Thus, when FDR met with King Abdul-Aziz bin Sa’ud (“Ibn Sa’ud) in 
1945, a marriage of convenience was born.347  The original reasons for this marriage 
have long since faded away, which begs the question, “Is it time for a divorce or can this 
relationship be sustained?” 
Throughout this tumultuous relationship, U.S.–Saudi ties have been continually 
challenged.  Saudi Arabia struggles with societal pressures on its ruling family, 
prompting a revalidation of its legitimacy, and forcing the Saudi government to loosen 
the reigns on its historically repressed subjects in order to appease their desires for 
reform.  Moreover, these reforms are further complicated by the internal strife between 
elements of Saudi society, with some drawing closer to Wahhabism, while others seek a 
more moderate form of Islam that enhances personal freedom and modernity.  
Consequently, as the Saudis struggle to distance themselves from a perceived “Western 
crusade,” precipitating the reinforcement of Islamic values worldwide, the U.S–Saudi 
relationship continues to suffer.  
Nevertheless, the U.S. still views the strategic partnership as vital, as Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia has the largest oil reserves in the world, as well as being the leading oil 
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exporter, having a significant impact on the global economy.348  Likewise, Saudi Arabia 
relies on close ties with the U.S. for its security and defense, due to the Kingdom’s 
inability to defend itself, especially against formidable foes.   
Saudi Arabia also desires to keep sea lanes and lines of communication open to 
insure the stable export of its oil. With the U.S. Navy, capable of providing maritime 
security for 2.5 million square miles of water, which includes the Arabian Gulf, Arabian 
Sea, Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman and parts of the Indian Ocean, the Saudi 
regime feels confident about its trade security.349 
Saudis, however, are especially fearful of an Iranian attack, as its oil fields would 
be a valuable target. Iranian aggression could potentially incite Shi’a revolt within the 
Kingdom and throughout the region, as there are large concentrations of Shi’a in the 
Gulf, especially in Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait and in the Kingdom proper.350  As champions 
of the Sunni Muslim World, the Saudi regime feels a moral obligation to contain Shi’a 
expansionism and support Sunni causes the world over.  The Kingdom will, therefore 
continue to rely on the U.S. military for training, weaponry and protection, especially for 
its internal security. 
An ongoing issue that challenges the U.S.–Saudi partnership is the Kingdom’s 
internal struggle between Saudi reformers and Wahhab traditionalists, each battling to 
implement the correct flavor of Islam in the Kingdom and abroad.  Saudi conservatives 
oppose what they perceive as sacrilegious social influences stemming from the United 
States and the West, as they have feared all along.  American military power in the 
Persian/Arabian Gulf region and the perceived U.S. failure to facilitate a resolution to the 
Israeli–Palestinian conflict continues to propagate Arab resentment in the Middle East, 
and has also spurred increased anti-Americanism and terrorism. 
                                                 
348 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, “Background Note-Saudi Arabia,” 
February 2008; http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3584.htm [Last accessed September 13, 2008].   
349 “Area of Operations,” USNAVCENT, http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/mission/index.html [Last 
Accessed April 1, 2008]. 
350 Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future (New York, New 
York, W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), 230-242. 
 61
Many in the United States believe that Saudi Arabia sponsors terrorist movements 
throughout the world.  This is believed, in part due to the rampant anti-Arabism and a 
naïve misconception that “all Muslims are terrorists.”  The events of 9/11 only brought 
this xenophobic sentiment to the forefront, in both the United States and the Middle East.  
Hatred has been directed at Saudi Arabia because fifteen of the nineteen hijackers in the 
9/11 tragedy were of Saudi descent, which spawned the perception that Saudi Arabia 
promotes this type of extreme fanaticism.  
Anti-Saudi sentiment has also been exacerbated by conspiracy-theory-type films, 
such as filmmaker Michael Moore’s Fahrenheit 9/11, which sought to provide Americans 
a simple explanation for the events of 9/11.  Additionally, numerous publications, such as 
Sleeping with the Devil: How Washington Sold its Soul for Saudi Crude, Forbidden 
Truth:  U.S. – Taliban Secret Oil Diplomacy, Saudi Arabia and the Failed Search for Bin 
Laden, and House of Bush, House of Sa’ud:  the Secret Relationship Between the Worlds 
Two Most Powerful Dynasties, have collectively added to the increased hatred Americans 
feel for the Saudis.351 
Americans have also reacted very negatively to televised slayings of kidnapped 
Westerners, perceived as having been inspired by Arab governments in a campaign to rid 
the world of “infidels” seeking to poison Islamic society with their modernity.  This 
perception existed long before 9/11, and the increased ferocity of this angry discourse 
continues to erode the fragile ties Americans have with the Saudis.352   
Anti-Americanism in the Kingdom is strong and may stem, in part from the 
pressure of American influences; the consequences of Saudi dependence on American 
military strength — which to Saudis perceive as detrimental to Arab and Muslim unity; 
Saudi frustrations with the American reaction to the second intifada; and erosion of 
peaceful efforts between Palestinians and Israelis.  Sympathies or favorable views of 
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Islamism also create strong anti-Americanism. Salafists, who resist the Saudi government 
questioning the legitimacy of the royal family, are especially critical of the United States.  
Recent American aggression, such as the 1991 Gulf War, the U.S. invasion of 
Afghanistan, and the ongoing campaign in Iraq are all considered to be an extension of a 
colonialist power that has existed for hundreds of years in the region. Salafists, including 
the famed Islamic scholar, Dr. Safar al-Hawali, produced a document in an attempt to 
convey a better understanding of Islam, entitled, “How We Can Coexist,”353 in response 
to a letter from American intellectuals, entitled, “What We’re Fighting For,” which 
outlines American values and the justification for the U.S. war on terror.354  The Salifist 
view is that the U.S. is fighting a war on Muslims under the guise of the “war on terror,” 
and that the U.S. has too many double standards when it comes to enforcing human 
rights.  Israel’s abuse of Palestinians and its non-compliance to U.N. resolutions is cited 
throughout this publication as a case in point.355   
Beyond Iraq, disappointment with the Israeli-Palestinian situation and America’s 
role in that crisis is not necessarily the source of Islamist extremism, though it remains an 
element in extremist anti-American discourse.  It is a thorn in the side of many Arab 
liberal reformers because Saudis perceive the situation as a contradiction to the U.S. 
policy of “forwarding freedom” and the historic American championing of representation 
and justice under the law.  Saudis, like other Arabs were amazed that Crown Prince 
Abdullah’s initiative in Beirut in 2002 on this matter was not met with a very public 
enthusiastic response in the United States.  An effort to bridge the cultural divide 
therefore has to be the underlying emphasis of dialogue between the U.S. and Saudi 
governments, for ignoring this will only continue to perpetuate tensions. 
Given the ongoing issues, it is unlikely that the United States and Saudi Arabia 
will return to the relatively stable and cooperative, but sometimes tumultuous relationship 
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of the past.  Though relationship has obviously suffered setbacks and challenges to its 
existence, particularly given the circumstances in the last ten years or so, the 
overwhelming need to maintain the strategic partnership that has long been its 
foundation, continues to override the distractions of lesser significance, regardless of how 
important others may deem them to be.  A divorce between these two nations, therefore, 
is not imminent, though the partnership has been strained and may never fully recover 
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